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Foucault's Thinking Historical Subjectivity 
Ladelle Me Whorter 
In the Introduction to The Use of Pleasure Foucault calls his 
work an askesis, "an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought." 
The "living substance of philosophy," Foucault writes, is the essay, 
"which should be understood as the assay or test by which, in the 
game of truth, one undergoes changes, and not as the simplistic 
appropriation of others for the purpose of communication."1 Foucault's 
work, then, does not simply report to us his conclusions or theories. 
Foucault is not primarily interested in imparting information. What 
he offers instead is a kind of exercise book. 
Hence, if we are to think through Foucault's work, we need first 
to think the meaning of the word exercise. An exercise, of course, is 
a kind of practice, a practice designed to change the one who 
undergoes it. We undertake various programs of exercise in order to 
alter ourselves in some way. We engage in physical exercises to 
change the contours of our bodies or magnify their strength, to clear 
our minds of anger or depression, or to stimulate ourselves for 
intellectual work. We engage in mathematical or logic exercises in 
order to train ourselves in the patterns of mathematical or logical 
thought, as we engage in grammatical exercises in order to discipline 
our writing and speech. Exercises are transforming practices, 
practices "by which ... one undergoes changes." 
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An exercise book, then, requires an approach quite different from 
most works of professional scholarship. If a typical work of scholarship 
is to be understood as simply a report of its author's conclusions, 
suggestions, and perhaps still-embryonic ideas, then it may be taken 
as a product, the result of an agent's or a subject's having acted to 
produce it. As such it is an object to be perceived and judged and 
thought about, an object external to and separable from us subjects 
who read and judge it. But an exercise book demands to be treated 
as a very different kind ofthing. If it is the case that exercise, askesis, 
is a transformative practice, then Foucault's exercise books cannot 
be adequately comprehended by the notion 'object'. They cannot be 
perceived and read and judged by a subject whose being is wholly 
external to them. As we have noted, an exercise is a practice whose 
very nature it is to alter the practitioner. And that means that the 
practitioner (the writer, the reader) and the practice are not external 
to one another. As the askesis plays out, the boundaries necessary 
for maintaining subjective and objective identities shift and may even 
erode. 
Exercises are often empowering and enlightening. There may 
be very good reasons for engaging in them. However, we who have 
Nietzsche's works as part of our heritage have reason to hesitate. In 
the wake ofthe third essay in On the Genealogy of Morals, Foucault's 
use of the word askesis, from which we get asceticism, cannot help 
but make us wince. We cannot help but notice that asceticism, like 
Foucault's askesis, denotes self-transforming practice; asceticism, too, 
changes the subject who undergoes it. Foucault's use of such a closely 
related word forces us to ask the question: Is it possible that Foucault 
the neo-Nietzschean in some sneaky or occluded way embraces the 
ascetic ideal after all? Is Foucault's askesis just a new twist in the 
history of asceticism? Or does it bring with it a possibility for 
difference? In pursuit of that question we first need to examine 
Nietzsche's genealogy of asceticism. 
In On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche locates the beginning 
of the modern self-a being with interiority, memory, conscience, the 
ability to make promises-in a certain fastidiousness, a certain desire 
for keeping clean. 2 Modern selfhood begins in a dream of purity, of 
the putting aside, the exclusion of whatever appears extraneous, 
unnecessary, in excess. Perhaps it begins innocuously enough. This 
abstinence is empowering, self-affrrming; it breeds more of itself. And 
so a sorting process begins. As this complex of self-affirming drives 
intensifies itself, it discounts, excludes, perhaps in some cases denies 
that which it now names other. 
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Thus modern selfhood is born, and at the same time modern 
morality. By a process of sorting out and refusing there comes to be 
constituted a world, an "external world," an "evil world" from which 
the self rebounds and turns inward, relentlessly seeking that world's 
pure opposition, seeking to affirm itself. The modern selfs drive for 
self-affirmation is an ascetic drive. What are we modem ascetic selves 
seeking? That which is truly ourselves, the pure kernel, the self-
identical core. How shall we find it? Exclude all that merely adorns, 
all that clings, all that soils, all that corrupts. Thus asceticism begets 
the will to constancy, clarity, reliability, integrity, certainty, 
eternality, identity, the Selfsame. Thus asceticism begets the will to 
truth. 
Nietzsche pulls no punches. It is out of fear that asceticism 
begets this will to true identity. In order to perpetuate itself it must 
deny its origins in dispersed drives; it must insist upon the existence 
of a perfect unity at the heart of things, underlying all that differs 
and dies, all that wrecks itself in the winds of change. It must insist 
on the persistence of its self-identity in order to continue being what 
it is-the drive to purify. To do otherwise is to endanger itself, to risk 
itself. And that it will not do; that it is too fearful to do. 
Now, we could sit injudgment of Nietzsche's discourse; we could 
criticize his logic or his sense ofhistory. We could even out-Nietzsche 
him and fault him for reading too much simplicity into things. But 
none of that would change the fact that Nietzsche's discourse disturbs, 
and we undergo that disturbance, regardless of how we appropriate 
it. The discourse appropriates us. We find ourselves within its lineage. 
It gives rise to us. 
We ascetic selves probably will live out Nietzsche's attack on 
the ascetic ideal in embarrassment. It is embarrassing to find one-
self in a discourse whose own fearful, timid lineage is laid bare. 
Through Nietzsche's discourse the ascetic ideal inspires us with 
disgust. We smell ourselves and hurry to hold our noses. But that 
does not help, for the very gesture of nose-holding itself is an ascetic 
response, a rejection of impurity, a refusal of the corrupt. So, despite 
ourselves, the ascetic ideal plays itself out first in our embarrassment 
and then in our frustration within its tenacious grip. 
Therefore, when Foucault calls us to askesis unapologetically 
and without so much as a blush, we have every reason to be surprised, 
and somewhat suspicious as well. Just what is Foucault asking us 
to submit to? It would seem that he is asking us to participate in the 
perpetuation of asceticism's ugly history, a perpetuation all the worse 
for its apparent forgetfulness of Nietzsche's thought. But Foucault's 
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askesis purports to be other than an insistence upon ascetic 
submission to rigid identity structures. It purports to be the very 
opposite, in fact-an attempt to think subjectivity in the absence of 
transhistorical structure, the pure kernel of the ascetic dream. 
However, if this claim to otherness is true, Foucault is engaged in 
an apparent paradox. He-a subject, a self, a person with a particular 
identity, that man Michel Foucault-is trying to exercise himself in 
the thinking of his own contingency, his own optionality. He is 
attempting to put himself through an exercise that would constitute 
the undergoing of his own dispersal. What are we to make of even 
the thought of that? 
Cynicism snaps: This call of his for inwardness, selfhood, and 
subjectivity to think its historical emergence out of disparate forces 
and shameful heterogeneous unions could not possibly emerge from 
within the ascetic complex that is modern subjectivity, unless-
unless-it is some new ploy, some new strategy for purification. 
Perhaps in Foucault's discourse the ascetic will is attempting to 
subject itself to a rigid identity in yet a new way; perhaps it is 
attempting to think dissension as-its truth. 
Foucault has been read that way, as Nietzsche has. Foucault's 
askesis can be read as a kind of vengeful attempt to humiliate the 
ascetically produced self-identical self by bringing it up against its 
real genealogical past. If we were to read Foucault this way we would 
understand him to be perpetuating and perhaps developing asceticism 
in at least two ways. First, he would be maintaining the notion of 
a pure, self-identical truth of the self. In other words, he would still 
be positing a constant core, but in this case the core would be 
something like the Freudian id, a petty, infantile, frightened little 
thing. Second, in addition to positing this pure center of being, 
Foucault's discourse would be a perpetuation of asceticism in the 
sense that he would be forcing himself, and us, to turn around and 
face this puny, ugly little truth that is ourselves; he would be forcing 
us to strip away our delusions of grandeur and our pride in order to 
be that which we really are; he would be imposing, once again, and 
in yet a new and more repulsive way, the rigid standard of absolute 
identity. He would be calling us to an ever more honest ownership 
of ourselves. (But lest this sound too cruel, let us hasten to add that 
in such debasement there is, we must admit, a certain ascetic appeal.) 
It would be unwise to discount this reading out of hand-as 
though we had some standard of truth against which it failed to 
measure up-so we will allow it to stand as a possible reading of 
Foucault's text. But there is an instability at the center of that 
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reading, an instability that is the reader him- or herself. In order to 
read Foucault's discourse as nothing but a perverse perpetuation of 
the ascetic ideal we must engage in a bit of ascetic refusal ourselves; 
we must insist that a discourse is the product of an author, a subject 
who acts. We must reject the possibility that Foucault's discourse itself 
might move us beyond the control of the ascetic self who produced 
or reads it. In other words, we must insist that there exist logically 
separable subjects and objects that stand in relation to each other 
as external causes and effects and maintain their identities regardless 
of change. But, if we pay careful attention to the transformative 
processes of askesis, we realize that that insistence is optional, and 
we can begin to undergo the possibility that there are other powers 
in this discourse of Foucault's, other voices besides the active, other 
grammars besides our Latinate substantive. The only way to find out 
is to engage the askesis and allow ourselves to undergo. 
We cannot reproduce Foucault's askesis here. However, some 
remarks may help us get a feel for some of the directions such an 
exercise might begin to take. Foucault's tool is genealogy, the patient, 
meticulous tracing of relations offorce. In Foucault's texts-Discipline 
and Punish, for example, as well as the sexuality series-what 
emerges are coherent, plausible accounts ofthe gradual manufacture 
of human selves-sexual selves, law-abiding selves, delinquent selves, 
moral selves, beings whose births bear great resemblance to the births 
of institutions, practices, and discourses of all kinds. 
In Foucault's discourse, a self-like an institution such as a legal 
system or a state-is not best understood as something substantial 
and enduring. In a certain sense neither a self nor an institution is 
a thing at all. Both are better thought as occurrings, innumerable 
indiscrete events. Some analogies may be of help. 
If one were to make a film of an immobile object stationed in 
a windowless room and then were to project that film for an audience, 
what the audience would see would be a still image. But the image 
would be sustained not by some enduring substance manifesting itself 
or deigning to appear. Rather, the image would be sustained by dozens 
and perhaps hundreds or thousands of bursts of patterned light. The 
apparently stable image would continually occur rather than subsist. 
Perhaps a better example is the shape formed when water rushes 
down a circular drain. Despite its visibility and regularity, this funnel 
shape is not a subsisting thing; it is simply the sensible tension of 
a set of forces in play. It exists only as long as those forces maintain 
a certain equilibrium.3 
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For Foucault, the world occurs, as the film image and the water 
funnel occur, as always changeable sets of repeated force events 
clashing against each other or holding each other in tension. We need 
posit no subsisting things. We may think among events, as ourselves 
events, of the eventful character of seemingly subsistent things. Does 
this mean we have thought those things in their truth? Not in this 
discourse, if by truth we mean some constant reality, some subsisting 
thing. The ascetic insistent upon constancy finds itself in continual 
frustration here. There is no constant truth of the ascetic self, not 
even an ugly one. 
Self, then, as part of the eventful world, is itself eventful. It is 
to be thought as a nexus of repeating force events remaining more 
or less steady through time. Selves take many different shapes, as 
it were, as force events shift, are unable to repeat, or occur at a 
reduced level of energy vis-a-vis one another. Nevertheless, the shifts 
are usually minor; selves remain identifiable most of the time. This 
is to be expected, unless there is some relatively cataclysmic change 
in the sustaining patterns of force events. But what ifthere is? Well, 
then, selves may be dramatically altered. Some may die. New forms 
may be born. 
Postcataclysmic arrangements are not predictable; for, in an 
eventful world, there are no underlying, hidden laws or structures 
that govern change. However, the emergings of arrangements are 
often traceable in retrospect. Certain sorts of force networks might 
come to show themselves as essential to the maintenance of a given 
equilibrium. One might interrogate such a network with regard to 
its structure and emergence and so begin to think the history of its 
becoming the essence of a particular arrangement or current 
equilibric form. 4 
Selves, then, have histories, of course, but they also are 
historical. They are not subsisting entities to which things happen, 
around which events occur; not enduring substances whose manifes-
tations are sometimes deformed or incomplete; selves occur at every 
instant, and at every instant their occurring interacts with or conflicts 
with, reinforces or disrupts all sorts of other occurrings "in" the 
matrices of world-event. Analyses will accordingly be multiple and 
complex. Hence genealogy as opposed to a quest for truth. 
But back to our first question: must we read Foucault's discourse 
as a new and more insidious ascetic trap? As long as we insist upon 
reading it-as-an-object, protecting ourselves from its action, remaining 
in tight control, perhaps that is all that it can be. Perhaps we will 
never read it as anything but a fanciful report on the contents of 
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Michel Foucault's mind. But when the discourse begins to stir us, 
when the askesis gets underway, something else may very well occur. 
A first sign that something else is occurring is the appearance 
of fear. Very often, and as Nietzsche no doubt would have predicted, 
this fear expresses itself as a desire to maintain social or moral order. 
Time after time students and colleagues have voiced to me their fear 
that if we cease to hold to the notion that selves have self-identical, 
transhistorical cores, we will no longer be able to hold people respon-
sible for what they do. And, if people cannot be held responsible, order 
cannot be maintained. Might will equal right, and society will 
degenerate into a war of all against all. 
One response to that fear might be: what makes you think that 
that is not how things are now? But as an initial answer, such would 
be a frivolous response. A second, less frivolous response might be 
to question the logic of the fear. Does the absence oftranshistorical 
subjectivity necessarily result in the preclusion of personal respon-
sibility? The answer to that question is, I think, no, but eventually, 
as we undergo Foucault's discourse, the question itself comes to seem 
strange and answering it comes to seem beside the point. Nonetheless 
it will be instructive to pursue this issue briefly here. 
First, we need a better account of the allegedly threatened link 
between constant self-identity and personal responsibility. A little 
social observation can give us that. Apparently one of the rules of 
the game of responsibility assignments is that one should not hold 
someone responsible for a situation if that person is other than the 
person who brought it about. For example, most people would not be 
likely to consent to holding the grandchildren of a murderer 
responsible for the murderer's crimes. (Of course, as we know, people 
really do hold relatives responsible for the wrongdoing of others. 
Entire families are treated with contempt when one family member 
offends the public taste. And, without doubt, there are times when 
outrage over one incident turns into violence against whoever 
happens to get in the injured one's way. But these cases, most would 
insist, are regrettable reminders of the imperfections of human beings, 
not true exemplars of justice well wrought.) Likewise, many people 
would argue that one cannot hold a person responsible for an act if 
the person has changed significantly since its commission. When a 
prisoner pleads that he was temporarily insane at the time of the act, 
he may be understood in part to be claiming that he is not the same 
man in some important way, so that to punish him now would be 
unjust. We might also understand the sentiment "he has suffered 
enough" to mean in part "because of what he has undergone he has 
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changed since the time of the egregious act, so it is not appropriate 
to hold the person he is now responsible for it." At any rate, it seems 
clear that we typically require a person who is to be held responsible 
for something to have a fairly stable identity through time. Therefore, 
anything we do to undermine our ordinary belief in stable personal 
identity cores threatens our ability to hold people responsible for 
whatever occurs. 
Of course, stability of identity is not the only official prerequisite 
for holding someone responsible. In order for us legitimately to hold 
a person responsible for something, he or she must be related to it 
as its cause. It is officially illicit to blame, for example, the bearer 
of bad news. We should reserve our wrath for the person who actually 
brought the bad situation about. 
Now, some claim that Foucault's historicization of the subject 
places in question the notion that there is any stable core, any identity 
that would unify the undergoing of punishment with the commitment 
of an act. If the transhistorical self is merely a dream of Western man, 
then subjective duration is just an illusion, too. Foucault has destroyed 
the responsible self. 
This, however, is simply not the case. Foucault is not attempting 
(primarily, or even necessarily) to dismantle the responsible self; he 
is attempting to understand how it came to be, a task whose 
presuppositions obviously include a conviction that there do exist such 
selves. Foucault's work does not suggest that no one is ever really 
responsible for anything; it does suggest that responsibility is 
historically formed and its necessary preconditions are maintained 
by relations of force. Foucault's primary question is not, how can we 
expose and dispose of an illusion?, but rather, how did the real 
phenomenon of self-identity come to be and how is it sustained in a 
given discursive region? His genealogical analyses of sexuality and 
desire are examples of his attempts to understand how forms of self-
identity are constructed and how they are reproduced within networks 
of power relations that themselves are unstable and shifting. As we 
said before, Foucault's understanding of the self-identical self is that 
it is not a persisting entity so much as it is a steady repeating of 
relations or events, like the film image or the water funnel. 
Of course, even if Foucault leaves us with some shimmering 
alternative to the stable responsible self, he may still threaten the 
game of responsibility assignments on some other front. If we are to 
be able to hold people responsible in the usual ways, we also need 
to be able to understand a self as a cause and, furthermore, as a cause 
that is not itself totally caused. 
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If self is impinged upon by social, historical, or linguistic forces, 
then self is not an uncaused cause. Little will eliminate our desire 
to hold someone responsible faster than our deciding that the person 
was absolutely unable to behave otherwise than he or she did. 
Foucault's view seems to eliminate the possibility that selves 
are not completely determined by social forces. For, if selves are 
maintained at every moment by power networks, then each self must 
be at the mercy of the networks that hold it together and make it 
up. Therefore the self itself is not responsible for what it does. 
However, this way of thinking is not Foucault's. This way of 
thinking still assumes that self is somehow independent of the forces 
in question. On Foucault's view, self is precisely not something upon 
which historical forces act. Self is the networks of forces themselves. 
These forces are not causes external to the product they create. Self 
simply is those forces in tension with themselves. The analytic 
dichotomy inside/outside just breaks down.5 
To reiterate, in order to understand self as not responsible for 
any of its acts, we must assume self to be a kind of thing preexisting 
the forces that act upon it and external to them. But if self is those 
forces or some subset of them, it is not merely being acted upon. 
Therefore, while it is true that in Foucault's discourse it is not the 
case that self is an uncaused cause, the pure origin of its a posteriori 
acts, neither is it the case that self is nothing but the middle billiard 
ball in a combination shot. Personal responsibility does not 
necessarily go out the window; but it does need to be rethought. (And 
I would like to suggest that that might be part of what Foucault was 
doing the last years of his life.) 
But far more interesting than the idea that Foucault could 
answer his critics on more or less their own terms-that he can 
perhaps reassure them that the game of responsibility assignments 
need not be stopped or lost-is the existence of this threatened posture 
itself. We may take this as a clue that, while on some levels Foucault's 
discourse may be a perpetuation and development of the power of 
ascetic drives, on some level those drives are also threatened with 
erosion and possibly undermined. Let us look again at asceticism as 
self-transformative practice. 
It is the case, within Nietzsche's account, that asceticism 
transforms itself as it affirms itself and extends its strength. Ascetic 
drives refine themselves, produce ever finer points of distinction as 
the sorting process of self and other plays itself out. The ascetic self, 
then, undergoes changes as the process intensifies, becoming more 
powerful perhaps and ever more rigidly defined. The ascetic self is 
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subjected and subjectified by the processes of purification that posit 
its ever more carefully delineated identity core. The ascetic self 
en-selfs itself by enforcing the continued stability of the identity it 
seeks to be. Asceticism is a powerfully paradoxical drive for constant 
self-transformation toward a perfect stasis in a pure unity of self-
identical repose. 
Foucault's askesis bears great resemblance to the movement of 
self-transformative ascetic drives. The ascetic selfs drive to know 
itself is certainly apparent in Foucault. And there is a sense in which 
in Foucault we encounter a kind of truth, a truth that the self is not 
self-identical but rather that it is an amalgamation of disparate forms. 
The ascetic self, upon encountering that "truth," upon acceding to 
the plausibility of genealogical accounts, begins, predictably enough, 
to discipline itself to that self-knowledge, to bring itself into 
intellectual conformity with that truth. 
But when the drive to purify confronts the "truth" of its own 
impurity, when it runs headlong into the contradictory project of 
attempting to pare itself down to its fundamental multiplicity, ascetic 
selfhood begins to undergo the self-transforming power of Foucault's 
discourse, and the valences that held themselves in tension to produce 
the notion of a perfect unity, of some enduring Same, must necessarily 
shift. The thought of self in the center of Foucault's discourse is the 
thought of transgression, a reversal of forces, a gradual or perhaps 
violent turning outward of the valences before turned in, like fingers 
pulling loose from a stone they have gripped too hard for too long. 
It will be necessary to find a different way to speak: When there occurs 
the undergoing of the genealogical stripping away of the argumen-
tative and commonsense forces sustaining belief in the unitary self, 
when there occurs the undergoing of the exposure ofthe fearful and 
nonrational drives that put those beliefs in place, there may occur 
a kind of death of the ahistorical self, just as, in Nietzsche's discourse, 
when there occurs the undergoing of the exposure of the ungodliness 
that supported gods, there occurs a kind of death of the ahistorical 
God. As the thought of God loses its power to shape a world, the 
thought of a unitary self-identity begins to lose its power to shape 
a life. 
And what then? Will human being simply fly apart? Will we 
all go stark raving mad? Will might equal right and society 
degenerate into a war of all against all? Perhaps. But why should 
it come that? Selfishness would be a strange thing in a discourse that 
did not insist upon the unity of self-identical selves. Perhaps, as 
Nietzsche says, morality and evil are Siamese twins. 
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Foucault's discourse, then, like ascetic discourses, is a self-
transformative exercise. It is an askesis that allows the powers of 
ascetic selfhood to bring themselves to bear in characteristic ways. 
But because Foucault's discourse draws asceticism to focus its self-
transformative power on the drive for purification itself, ascetic 
selfhood finds itself in question. Not only does self-transformation 
occur here, but there is within the discourse an awareness of this 
transformative power and an allowance of it as opposed to a denial 
or an attempt at masterful control. Thus, like ascetic discourses, 
Foucault's is a discourse that transforms itself; but it transforms itself 
from an active production of an agent-subject to a process of self-
overcoming that opens possibilities for movements of differing rather 
than the continued movement of purification that is an insistence 
upon the identity of the same. 
Yes, Foucault's discourse begins as and in some ways may be 
read as remaining an ascetic discourse. It draws its energy from its 
ascetic lineage and past. But within Foucault's discourse ascetic 
selfhood cannot maintain control of the direction of its own forceful 
drives. Thus, as Foucault's discourse operates upon the forces at its 
own discursive center, something other to asceticism may begin to 
emerge, something we ascetic selves are not able to name, something 
that will resist the ascetic drive to label and identify, but something 
the undergoing of which may be either beautiful or terrible or both 
but which will definitely be-to use a Nietzschean word-interesting. 
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that is it does not endure in and of itself but only as a result ofthe continual 
flow of energy in the system. An example might be instructive. Consider a 
vortex in a stream of flowing water. The vortex is a structure made of an 
ever-changing group of water molecules. It does not exist as an entity in the 
classical Western sense; it exists only because of the flow of water through 
the stream. In the same sense, the structures out of which biological entities 
are made are transient, unstable entities with constantly changing molecules, 
dependent on a constant flow of energy from food in order to maintain form 
and structure .... From this point of view the reality of individuals is 
problematic because they do not exist per se but only as local perturbations 
in this universal flow." Callicott cites this from Morowitz's "Biology as a 
Cosmological Science," in Main Currents in Modern Thought28 (1972): 156. 
4. It is important to notice how very differently the word essence 
functions in this context from the way it seems to function in classical 
contexts. Essence here is the name of whatever historically emerging forces 
function to maintain a particular structure and protect it from perversion 
or disintegration. Essence does not name the truth of any set of structures 
or forces. 
5. The breakdown of the dichotomy inside/outside occurs here much 
as it does in ecological discourse (compare note 3). Once thinking begins to 
occur in the absence of the classical liberal notion of atomic individuality, 
the rigid distinction between what is I and what is not-1 (or what is here inside 
and what is there outside) carries little force. Perhaps what we are moving 
toward is an ecological understanding of human being. 
